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■ Academic Paper

Lobbying in the sunshine—hiding behind
transparency?
Albert Veksler*
Business School, Dublin Institute of Technology, Dublin, Ireland

Lobbying in Israel was unregulated for 60 years. Scholars have decried the fact that high value is attached to the
written decree, but implementation does not necessarily follow: quite a few laws have remained at symbolic level
in Israel. There were two unsuccessful bills submitted to legislate lobbying regulation: ﬁrst by Knesset Member
(MK) Merom in 1993 and the second one by MK Naot in 2001. The bill submitted by MKs Yechimovich and Sa’ar
in 2007 resulted in passing the Israeli lobbying regulations in 2008, but the Lobbyist Law displayed unexpected characteristics, and there was a 500% growth in lobbyist numbers. In 2012, a scandal shook the Israeli lobbying world as a
crew from the Israeli Channel 2’s investigative show Uvda (‘Fact’) inﬁltrated the training program of the Gilad
Government Relations & Lobbying ﬁrm. Following the Channel 2 exposé, the Speaker of the Knesset MK Rivlin
instructed Knesset employees to immediately forbid the entrance of all lobbyists to areas heavily used by MKs. These
steps, taken almost 4 years after that the Knesset had passed a weak Lobbyist Law, scoring 28 points according to the
Center of Public Integrity score, did not create more transparency but only set certain restrictions on the lobbyists’
movements in the Knesset building. In 2013, MK Koll submitted a bill to further regulate the lobbying followed by
another bill by MKs Yechimovich and Tsur in 2014. However, these bills were thrashed as the Knesset was dispersed
in December 2014. This paper would analyze the bills from 1993, 2001, 2007, 2013, and 2014 by measuring their
strength according to the Center of Public Integrity Index in order to explore the path that resulted in passing the
Lobbyist Law in 2008 and in the following developments. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION
Chari et al. (2007: 422; 2009: 28) presented evidence
that lobbying regulations offer several advantages
to the political system: increased accountability to
the voters and transparency of the decision-making
processes, as well as diminishing gaps in the system, which would otherwise allow for corrupt behavior. Thomas (1998: 512–513) further explained
that the major value of lobbying regulation laws
has been in providing public disclosure that increases the potential for public/press scrutiny. Thomas’
(1998) research presented evidence that the more
public disclosure of lobbying exists in a state and
the more stringently regulations are enforced, the
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more open the process of group attempts to inﬂuence public policy is in the USA.
Yishai (1998b: 575) decried the fact that the
written decree has a high value in Israel, but implementation does not necessarily follow—quite a few
laws have remained at symbolic level. Shroff et al.
(2012: 223) argued that a given legal act is symbolic
when it serves the primary function of articulating
aspirations for social betterment, but will not necessarily lead to implementation of any new actions on
the ground. Also, Campbell (1993: 326) called the
third-party regulation of the Canada Post essentially symbolic, as it did not mark the creation of independent coercive power to alter Canada Post’s
behavior. Similarly, Matten (2003: 217) observed a
legislative act symbolic in that it prescribes a certain
regulatory intent of the government without at the
same time transforming this intent into concrete
and enforceable legal requirements. We will explore
the path that resulted in passing the Lobbyist Law
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in 2008 in order to determine the dynamics of the
legislative process, and to analyze the nature of the
Israeli Lobbying Law and the following legislative
developments.

THE ISRAELI CASE
Although lobby activity has existed in Israel since
prestate days, the commercial lobby was formed
only in the last decade of the 20th century
(Tal, 2009: a–b). During the 60 years of unregulated
lobbying in Israel, there were several unsuccessful
attempts made to regulate lobbying—ﬁrst of them
was foiled in 1954 (Yishai, 1998a: 164), as the
Labour Party’s attempt to extend its surveillance
over the civil society and to regulate interest groups
was blocked by parties and unions unwilling to
accept state regulation (Yishai, 1998b: 572). The
diversiﬁcation of participants in the political system
during Begin’s government exposed the need for
new communication channels for newcomers
(Tal, 2009: f); however, only one paid lobbyist
operated in the Knesset by the end of the 1980s
(Tal, 2012a: 154).
The Associations Law Bill was passed as a law—
after another failed attempt to pass the bill in 1964—
after a highly contentious Knesset debate in 1980
(Yishai, 1987). Highlighting an important characteristic of this legislative initiative, Yishai (1998a,
1998b: 575) argued that the Associations Law may
have exempliﬁed these symbolic laws whose purpose is more to manifest an attitude than to impose
a mode of behavior. Shroff et al. (2012: 223) differentiated that policy instruments are into two basic
groups: symbolic and material. A symbolic policy
instrument serves the primary function of articulating aspirations for social betterment, but will not
necessarily lead to implementation of any new actions on the ground. Shroff et al. (2012: 223) claimed
that legislatures often use resolutions to state these
symbolic aspirations. Material policy instruments,
categorized as either substantive or procedural,
Table 1

Examples of high-regulation, medium-regulation and low-regulation jurisdictions

High-regulation jurisdiction
Washington
Kentucky
New York
US Federal, 2007

are likely to result in changes in actual implementation practices. Material procedural policy instruments are those that affect implementation
processes, for example, creating a task force to
change the situation on the ground (Shroff et al.,
2012: 223).
Recent research has used data from the Center of
Public Integrity (2003), in order to theoretically
classify different lobbying regulatory environments.
The Center of Public Integrity (CPI) created a ranking system that assigns a score to each US state with
lobbying legislation, based on a survey containing a
series of questions regarding state lobby disclosure
(Appendix). The questions used in the CPI
addressed eight key areas of disclosure for state
lobbyists and the organizations that put them to
work: (i) deﬁnition of lobbyist; (ii) individual
registration; (iii) individual-spending disclosure;
(iv) employer-spending disclosure; (v) electronic
ﬁling; (vi) public access to a lobbyist registry; (vii)
enforcement; and (viii) revolving-door provisions,
focusing on ‘cooling-off’ periods. There are a total
of 48 questions for all of the eight sections: the more
points that are given, the stronger the legislation in
terms of promoting concepts such as full disclosure,
public access, and transparency. Chari et al. (2010:
109) took the CPI Index that was designed specially
for the USA, extended it beyond the USA and
compared the results with other democracies, which
have lobbying regulations; for the selected results,
see Table 1.
According to Chari et al. (2009: 8–10), the CPI
index goes well beyond the extent of earlier index
by Opheim (1991: 405–421) as it looks at individual
lobbyist registration, electronic ﬁling, public access,
and revolving-door provisions, all of which Opheim
(1991) bypassed. Thus, in expanding upon the range
of lobbying regulations studied by Opheim (1991),
and setting out 48 separately scored items, as
opposed to Opheim’s 22, the CPI’s framework
constitutes a broader, and deeper, approach to
analyzing the rigor with which jurisdictions
regulate lobbies. In addition, Hogan et al. (2012)

CPI
score

Medium-regulation
jurisdiction

CPI
score

Low-regulation
jurisdiction

CPI
score

87
79
74
62

Canada Federal, 2008
Hungary
Lithuania
Australia Federal

50
45
44
33

Israel
EU Commission
Poland
EU Parliament

28
24
28
15

CPI, Center for Public Integrity, EU, European.
Sources: Chari et al. (2010: 109) and the present research.
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combined the freedom of information laws with
measures on the strength of lobbying regulations
established in the extant literature and produced
something that they referred to as ‘sunshine score’.
Chari et al., (2010: 104–106) classiﬁed the regulatory systems as low, medium, and high regulation
systems. In the low-regulated systems, the deﬁnition of lobbyist does not recognize executive branch
lobbyists. Lobbyists’ lists are available to the public,
but not all details are necessarily collected (such as
spending reports by lobbyists). In the mediumregulated systems, the lobbyist must generally state
the subject matter/bill/governmental institution to
be lobbied. In addition, the deﬁnition of lobbyist
does recognize executive branch lobbyists. There
are clearly gaps in individual-spending disclosures,
such as free ‘consultancy’ given by lobbyists to
political parties. In the highly regulated systems,
not only is subject matter/institution required
when registering but also the lobbyists must state
the name of all employees, notify almost immediately any changes in the registration, and must
provide a picture. Similar to medium-regulated
systems, the deﬁnition of lobbyist does recognize
executive branch lobbyists. Tight individual-spending disclosures are required: a lobbyist must ﬁle a
spending report, his or her salary must be reported,
all spending must be accounted for and itemized, all
people on whom money was spent must be identiﬁed, spending on household members of public
ofﬁcials must be reported, and all campaign spending must be accounted for. Employer-spending disclosure is also tight. Unlike other ‘low-regulated’
or ‘medium-regulated’ systems, the employer of a
lobbyist is required to ﬁle a spending report, and
all salaries must be reported. State agencies can,
and do, conduct mandatory reviews/audits, and
there is a statutory penalty for late and incomplete
ﬁling of a lobbying registration form (Chari et al.,
2010: 104–106). For more, please see Tables 1 and 2.
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LOBBYIST BILL OF 1993
At this stage, we will review the history of different
bills laid on the Knesset table and will start with analyzing the bill from 1993 in order to measure its
strength according to the CPI Index. According to
the proposal, submitted by Knesset Member (MK)
Merom in 1993, the Knesset Speaker was to be authorized to disqualify lobbyists at his or her discretion alone and deny them access to the Knesset.
Lobbyist was deﬁned as someone performing activity aimed at inﬂuencing an MK for pay in regard to
legislation and Knesset resolutions. Only the lobbyists were the target of regulation, not those who
hired their services (Yishai, 1998b: 569–570). The
initial proposal forbade lobbying activity on the
Knesset committees’ ﬂoor, in the corridors, and in
the cafeteria; and a lobbyist could enter the Knesset
only after securing permission from the MK he or
she wished to meet. The meeting could take place
only in a speciﬁed place, as no lobbying activity
would be permitted elsewhere (Yishai, 1998b: 570).
The lobbyist would face a series of prohibitions:
not to offer any beneﬁts, not to prod the MK into
personal commitment, not to deceive an MK, not
to mislead an MK regarding the public beneﬁt of
proposals, and not to conceal the fact that lobbyists
attempt to inﬂuence an MK’s activities (Yishai,
1998b: 570). The Merom’s Bill strength, according
to the CPI Index, reaches only the low score of 17.
The version presented to the Knesset in the ﬁrst
reading of the bill was more moderate: the proposer
commended the important function of lobbyists,
representing legitimate interests in the House, yet
described the lobbying activity as incompatible
with the orderly conduct of parliamentary life. MK
Merom denounced personal pushing and shoving
by the lobbyists and the tacit pressure exerted by
visitors with a stake in the Knesset agenda—
watching deliberations from the gallery constituted

Table 2
CPI
score

Medium-regulation
jurisdiction

CPI
score

Low-regulation
jurisdiction

CPI
score

Washington

87

Canada Federal, 2008

50

Israel Bills 2013 and 2014

Kentucky
New York
Wisconsin
Texas
US Federal, 2007

79
74
73
66
62

Hungary
Lithuania
US Federal, 1995
Australia Federal
Canada Federal, 1989

45
44
36
33
32

Israel 2008
Poland
EU Commission
Israel Bills 1993 and 2001
EU Parliament

33
31
28
27
24
17
15

High-regulation jurisdiction

CPI, Center for Public Integrity; EU, European.
Sources: Chari et al. (2010: 109) and the present research.
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a covert threat against the MK’s discretion. The
Speaker was to direct and manage the lobbyists’ activity after consultation with the Knesset committee.
The laws on party ﬁnances imposed a total ban on
ﬁnancial contributions from all types of associations, leaving interest groups outside the electoral
arena. This did not apply to individual candidates
running within their own parties: they could solicit
contributions within the period of 9 months before
the elections.
The move to regulate lobbying in 1993 proved
ineffectual—the Merom’s Bill attracted too little attention—only six MKs in addition to the initiator
participated in the debate as it pertained to only
ten paid lobbyists operating in the Knesset. MK
Merom criticized lobbyists ‘inﬂicting moderate
physical pressure through eye contact’, in order to
ensure that MKs vote in accordance with their
preferences (Yishai, 1997: 103). Other speakers
portrayed lobbying as a major civic right, and MK
Tichon suggested group professional representatives be invited regularly to testify before a Knesset
committee (Yishai, 1997: 103).
The reasons for the legislative initiative regarding
lobbying were grounded in the awareness that interest groups accumulated excessive power, which
may interfere with orderly parliamentary conduct.
MK Hanegbi described the situation with lobbyists
as follows:
The openness of parliamentary life constitutes a cause
of distress. We have lost the intimacy of the Knesset;
there are corridors that you cannot cross in less than
half an hour, because they catch you on your way.
You cannot have lunch without somebody hovering
over your head, you cannot sit in your room as somebody will enter without ﬁrst knocking on the door
(Yishai, 1998b: 572).
This quotation reveals the wide access available
to representatives of interest groups and that MKs
were constrained by their overwhelming presence.
This duality caused ambivalence: MKs said they
would support the bill and indeed did so, yet
voicing strong criticism simultaneously. First, no
distinction was made between lobbyists of sectional
interest groups and those representing ideological
movements. Secondly, was it only professional
lobbyists (estimated 10 at that time) or all those
attempting to inﬂuence legislators that were to be
regulated? Thirdly, it was difﬁcult to implement
the law, precisely because the Knesset was teeming
with citizens having an interest in its activity.
This story had a happy end for the lobbyists,
whose activity remained unregulated. Although
the bill was passed unanimously in a committee,
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

it was shelved there, never reaching the Knesset plenum again (Yishai, 1998b: 572–573). The appearance
of commercial lobbyists was not the real genesis of
the phenomena. In the beginning, it was carried
out by close associates of the government and by
MKs themselves, and therefore, the formal banning
of MKs from taking additional occupations since
September 1995 was an additional cause of commercial lobby growth (Tal, 2009: d). Implementation
of this ban harmed the ability of MKs to act as lobbyists, and commercial lobby stepped in to ﬁll the
need for lobbying (Tal, 2009: f).
Yishai (1998b: 573–575) explained the absence of
parliamentary lobbying regulation during this period with the modus operandi of the interest groups:
many MKs were afﬁliated to associations—trade
unions, local communities, and women/peace/ religious movements—which were linked to parties.
Limiting the options to inﬂuence the Knesset could
curtail the MK reelection prospects. Over-access of
group representatives to the Knesset made MKs feel
uncomfortable with pressures exerted by ‘other’ associations, but also made them reluctant to regulate
associations with which their parties were linked.

LOBBYIST BILL OF 2001
Next, we will analyze the bill proposed by MK
Naot to regulate lobbying in the Knesset in 2001
and measure its strength according to the CPI
Index. The bill, submitted to the Knesset Speaker
in March, was to bring order to the lobbyist activity
in the Knesset (Knesset Committee Protocols, 2010).
The Naot’s Bill deﬁned lobbyist as a person whose
occupation is to persuade an MK concerning legislative bills and regarding decisions of the Knesset.
Her bill deﬁned legislative action as formulation,
submission, permission, presentation, discussion,
or votation concerning a bill in the Knesset or in
the Committee, or concerning statutes that need
permission or an agreement of the Knesset or of a
committee. Lobbyists had to request a permit from
the Knesset Chairman for their activity in the
Knesset, and the Knesset Chairman was to clarify
the conditions for the permit with the permission
of the Knesset Committee through the Knesset
Rules of Procedure. The lobbyist permit was not
be given to state workers, deﬁned according to the
Civil Service (Pensions) Law, 5730–1970 (consolidated version), and to party workers, deﬁned according to the Political Parties (Financing) Law,
5733–1973. A lobbyist could not be a member of
the electing body, according to the deﬁnition of the
J. Public Affairs 16, 39–49 (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
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Civil Service Law 5719–1959 (Restriction of Party
Activities and Fund-raising).
Analyzing the Naot’s Bill according to the CPI Index, it only scores a low 17. Moreover, on 4 July
2001 at the Knesset plenum discussion, Minister of
Justice MK Meir Sheetrit did not recommend proceeding with the bill, but to change the Knesset
Rules of Procedure, because the Knesset Chairman
(the Speaker) was authorized to regulate the lobbyist activities in the Knesset. Because the minister of
Justice MK Meir Sheetrit recommended changing
the Knesset Rules of Procedure, the Knesset Chairman (Speaker) wrote that he is not interested in
passing a law that would regulate lobbying now.
MK Naot’s Bill was shelved (Knesset Committee
Protocols 2002.07.09).

LOBBYIST BILL OF 2007
MKs Yechimovich and Sa’ar proposed a bill for regulating the lobbyists’ activity in the Knesset, and the
ministerial committee on legislation conﬁrmed that
the government was in favor of the bill, on 16
December 2007 (Tal, 2012a: 154–155). The bill was
approved through a rushed procedure, which
obviated the need to lay it on the Knesset’s table
(Knesset Committee Protocols, 2010.12.17).
During the discussions in the Knesset Committee,
MK Sa’ar claimed that public interest was the idea
behind the legislation: ‘…when a lobbyist comes to
represent an issue that touches the legislation in
the Knesset, then this is already a public interest
issue. It’s not just something between the client
and the lobbyist, or the lobbyist and the member
of Knesset. This is the very idea behind the law’
(Knesset Committee Protocols, 2010.12.26: 19).
MK Steinitz emphasized that it is unacceptable
that lobbyists would put pressure on the MK or
make comments against the MKs during the committee meetings—there needs to be a restraint. He
explained that
…even without mentioning any beneﬁts, it is clear for
any Knesset member that when they are approached
by “Yediot [Aharonot]” or “Ma’ariv” or “Ha’aretz” –
since they are also owners of Channel 2, and some also
owners of Channel 10, “Vesti” and local newspapers –
it is clear that one would want to maintain good relations, here are many beneﬁts. It was clear to all MKs
and to me that if I would damage the relations, this
would come with a certain price. Thus ﬁrst, how do
we cope with this problem that sometimes the lobbyists
represent so powerful organizations that only by
…expressing protest against them would make the
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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MKs to fear for their souls… (Knesset Committee
Protocol, 2010.12.26: 36).
MK Sa’ar objected the lobbyists’ attempt to curb
the bill and promised that the regulation will be
continued with a much more comprehensive law:
I announce that there will be an additional bill to this
bill. This current bill is minimalistic; …gentlemen, it
is impermissible that they would bring this House to
their knees over this minimalistic bill, which prescribes a set of regulations, most minimalistic limitations that only can be and transparency in work and
even this they try to uproot (Knesset Committee
Protocol, 2010.12.26: 45).
The bill passed the second and third reading by a
vote of 54 in favor, with no abstainers or opponents.
The press covered the bill extensively, and most of
the reports took no explicit stand on the issue, but
their wording implied objection to the lobbyists’
activity. The Knesset passed a weak Lobbyist Law,
limited to regulate lobbying that takes place within
the limits of the Knesset compound and scoring
the low 28 points according to the CPI score. The
Israeli case does not fall clearly in the category of
the low-regulated systems, but displays the characteristics of both low-regulated and medium-regulated systems: lobbying lists are available for
public scrutiny, and no spending disclosures are
required like in low-regulated systems, while lobbyists must reveal their employers—a characteristic to the medium-regulated systems.
Like in low-regulated systems, Israel has a
weak paperwork for registration, the deﬁnition of
lobbyist does not recognize executive branch
lobbyists, and the list of lobbyists is available, but
not detailed, or updated frequently. Little enforcement capabilities are invested in state agency, similar to low-regulated systems, yet there is a 1-year
cooling-off period, which again refers to mediumregulated systems. While the public can see who
the lobbyist is and what issue the lobbying might
be on, they cannot obtain a complete picture of
those employing the lobbyists (Veksler, 2012:
274–275). For a more thorough analysis of the
Israeli law, see Appendix.

LOBBYIST SCANDAL
Zrahiya (2013) described the scandal that shook the
Israeli lobbying world. A crew from the Israeli
Channel 2’s investigative show Uvda (‘Fact’) inﬁltrated the training program of the Gilad Government Relations & Lobbying ﬁrm. Using a hidden
J. Public Affairs 16, 39–49 (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
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camera, they showed a lecturer on behalf of Gilad
Government Relations & Lobbying in a course on
lobbying, who boasted about promoting laws in
the Knesset, designed for the narrow business
interests of speciﬁc companies. One example given
by him was the Fluorescent Vest Law, allegedly
promoted by the Gilad Government Relations &
Lobbying, stipulating that every Israeli driver
carries a ﬂuorescent vest in his car and uses it when
exiting it on the road’s shoulder. The legislation was
presented as an instance in which the ﬁrm was able
to advance the interests of its client, the 3 M
Company. He also bragged how they succeeded
feeding necessary information to the Knesset
Research and Information Centre, responsible for
writing the policy papers for the MKs, in order to
promote a law on the immunization against cervical
cancer on behalf of a pharmaceutical company.
Following the Channel 2 exposé, the Speaker of
the Knesset MK Rivlin instructed Knesset employees to immediately forbid the entrance of all lobbyists to areas heavily used by MKs, as well as from
the many ofﬁce areas. Rivlin barred lobbyists from
entering the Knesset cafeteria as well as the ofﬁces
of the speaker, the director general, the parliamentary secretary, the legal department and the Knesset
research center, among other locations in the
building (Zrahiya, 2014a). He also sent a missive
to all the Knesset staff, forbidding them from having
any contact with lobbyists, directly or indirectly.
Today, as the new rules are in place, any meeting
between a lobbyist and a Knesset employee must
receive advance, written approval from a senior
Knesset ofﬁcial, and they must report on any chance
meeting with a lobbyist. Any such meeting must be
followed by a written report, and any materials
provided by the lobbyist must also be submitted
(Harkov, 2012b). These desperate steps were late,
as they were taken almost 4 years after that the
Knesset had passed a weak Lobbyist Law, scoring
only 28 points according to the CPI Index. These
steps—although presented as a solution for the problem—did not create more transparency but only
set certain restrictions on the lobbyists’ movements
in the Knesset building and curbed lobbyists’ access
to certain areas (Veksler, 2012: 274–275).
Knesset lobbyists published an ethical code on
13 May, following a wave of negative publicity
about their profession (Harkov, 2012a). The
Forum for Government Connections, which
consists of most Israeli lobbying ﬁrms, released
the list of rules after a series of meetings in which
lobbyists discussed the proper way to work with
elected ofﬁcials and government bureaucrats. The
new ethical code was based on those of the
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Association of Accredited Lobbyists to the
European Union and the American League of
Lobbyists, two of the strictest lobbying groups
in the world, according to the forum. According
to the code’s introduction, its goal is to ‘increase
the public’s faith in the profession and the
democratic process’(Harkov, 2012a).

LOBBYIST BILL OF 2013
A bill seeking to deﬁne any Knesset visitor with an
agenda as a lobbyist was brought to a Ministerial
Committee for Legislation vote on 2 June (Zrahiya,
2014b), submitted by MK Koll (Yesh Atid) having
received the support of 12 party colleagues (MKs
Lapid, German, Peri, Razvozov, Shelah, TamanoShata, Kariv, Levi, Cohen, Toporovsky, Hoffman,
and Elharar). The bill proposed several changes to
the existing Lobbyist Law: lobbyists have to submit
periodic reports to the Knesset speaker, and he or
she would impose a waiting period of a year and a
half before MKs, cabinet members, and senior ministry staff could engage in lobbying after leaving the
government (Knesset Laws. Bill, 830/19/)פ.
According to the Explanatory Part of the Bill, the
proposal would increase transparency in lobbyists’
work and turn anyone who enters the Knesset to
convince MKs of something as subject to the laws
applying to lobbyists (Knesset Laws. Bill, 19/פ/
830). This would include in-house lobbyists,
employed by an organization or company as opposed to a lobbying agency; lawyers or accountants
representing a company or group in committee
meetings; and parties’ central committee members
(Harkov, 2013). The bill expands the application of
the Lobbyists’ Law beyond the Knesset, meaning
that lobbyists would have to register and identify
themselves in parliamentary committee meetings
taking place outside the Knesset building. Harkov
(2013) thought that the proposed law would also
cover lobbying the government ministers, but there
is no clear mention of it in the text of the bill
(Knesset Laws. Bill, 830/19/)פ. This legislative
initiative took into account the report by Israel
Democracy Institute (2013) on lobbyists. As a result,
MK Koll’s Bill would signiﬁcantly limit lobbyists’
access to the Knesset and its meetings by taking
away their permanent entry identiﬁcation and requiring them to register with security each time they
enter. The lobbyists also would have to report the
reason why they want to enter the Knesset each
time they apply for the entrance permit (Knesset
Laws. Bill, 830/19/)פ.
J. Public Affairs 16, 39–49 (2016)
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Under the bill, lobbyists would be required to
report their clients, the issues they deal with, and
whether they are a candidate for a position through
a political party. All of these details would be
added to the section on the Knesset website where
lobbyists are listed. Former ministers, MKs, and
directors-general of ministries (according to the current law, only MKs and ministers) would not be able
to be lobbyists for at least 18 months after they left
their positions. Finally, under MK Koll’s Bill, a committee composed of the Knesset Speaker and two of
his deputies would be allowed to ban a lobbyist
from the Knesset if he or she breaks the law
(Harkov, 2013). MK Koll’s Bill scores the medium
33 according to the CPI Index. The bill was not
passed, and in December 2014, the 19th Knesset
was dissolved.

LOBBYIST BILL OF 2014
MKs Yechimovich and Tsur (Hatnua) proposed
another bill that they called the ‘Machers’ Bill (macher
is a well connected lobbyist/ﬁxer in the Israeli
political system), expanding the existing Lobbyists
Law to government ministries, municipalities, stateowned companies, and other public ofﬁces (Harkov,
2014a, 2014b). This new bill would expand the Lobbyist Law of 2008—applying only to the Knesset,
and also to government ministries, municipalities,
state-owned companies, and other public ofﬁces.
This would be the ﬁrst time that a major gap in the
Lobbyist Law of 2008 would be dealt with. The
Explanatory Part of the Bill states:
The presence of “machers” in public ofﬁces became
a fact on the ground already long ago. The
“machers” know the bureaucratic system well and
enjoy personal connections with the clerks and the
publicly elected ofﬁcials as they take care of their
clients’ needs for a fee. This phenomenon creates
an inappropriate situation in which those with
money get preferred care by government bodies
due to their “machers” talents and connections
(Yechimovich & Tsur, 2014).
The Explanatory Part of the Bill also states that
‘machers’ work is often connected to corruption
and possible criminal acts, because of the economic
interests of the clients and the closeness of the
‘machers’ to the public ofﬁcials. In addition, the legislation quotes Judge Rozen’s (10291-01-12) ruling:
Use of mediators, “machers”, as they’re commonly
known, to promote different interests in public ofﬁces
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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is a common phenomenon in Israeli public service.
“Macher” is a person who can arrange and smooth
matters and bureaucratic processes in the ofﬁces of
the public bodies and with the policy makers and decision makers. This is a fast and comfortable track that is
not open to innocent, regular citizens who take the
normal path. The “macher” uses his personal “contacts” in the public system. The ones using “macher”
services are citizens who seek to promote their private
interests, as well as business and political organisations that seek to promote their ﬁnancial interests.
This is an inappropriate, corrupt and corrupting phenomenon. Rich people, who can afford “macher” services, enjoy a “special” channel to deal with their
private interests. This situation deteriorates citizens’
trust in public services and government institutions… It is worthy that the lawmakers should make
the limits of what is permissible and forbidden clear
even in areas of legitimate lobbying (Yechmovich &
Tsur, 2014).
In spite of the worthy cause and important aspirations, the ‘Machers’ Bill of 2014 scores again a low
31 according to the CPI Index. Moreover, in December 2014, the 19th Knesset was dissolved, and this
bill ended up in the trash bin of history.

DISCUSSION
Chari et al. (2010: 4) described lobbying regulations
as a set of codiﬁed formal rules, which are passed
by the parliament and often written in law that
must be respected and enforced. The latter point
suggests that the risk that lobbyists run in not complying with the rules results in penalization. In
many cases, this can mean a ﬁne or, potentially, a jail
sentence. Examples of such rules that lobbyists may
have to follow that Chari et al. (2010: 4) suggest
include the following: (1) registering with the state
before contact can be made with any public ofﬁcial,
clearly indicating which ministry/public actors the
lobbyist intends to inﬂuence; (2) providing the state
with individual-spending or employer-spending
disclosures; (3) having a publicly available list with
lobbyists details available for citizens to scrutinize;
and (4) ensuring that former legislators cannot immediately jump into the world of lobbying once
they have left public ofﬁce. The theoretical justiﬁcation for having this information is based on ensuring transparency and accountability in the political
system (Veksler, 2013: 2).
Firstly, it is important to point out that although
the lobbyists were supposed to register, the issues
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of spending disclosures were never discussed. In
spite of the fact that the Lobbyist Law of 2008 provided the publicly available list of lobbyists’ names,
the previously discussed bills and the Lobbyist Law
of 2008 did not even mention using any statutory
penalties. We are not talking about a ﬁne or a jail
sentence; the only possible penalty is losing one’s
lobbyist’ tag or being banned from the Knesset as
a lobbyist.
Secondly, the declared goals of the previously
discussed bills were always very general—‘public
interest’, ‘order’, ‘transparency’—and practically
impossible to achieve, enforce, or implement with
the policy tools that the bills actually provided.
For example, the MK Merom’s Bill viewed lobbying
activity as incompatible with the orderly conduct of
parliamentary life, yet no relevant policy tools were
offered to bring the solution to the problem. The
MK Naot’s Bill called to bring order to the lobbyist
activity in the Knesset (Knesset Committee Protocols, 2010.11.21). Again, no relevant policy tools
were provided to achieve the declared goal. The
low CPI score revealed the weakness of the
legislative initiative. Similarly, in 2007, MK Sa’ar
declared that public interest, order, and transparency were the goals of the Lobbyist Bill. MK
Yechimovich declared that the Lobbyist Law
balanced the strength of the rich who are represented by lobbyists in the parliament and the
wide public, through manifestation of the lobbyists’
details and their clients, and wearing a special
badge (Shelly Yechimovich, 2009). The goals were
worthy, yet there was no legal provision made,
and there were no adequate policy tools offered to
achieve the previously mentioned goals. True, the
law did create some transparency, but not as it was
declared—transparency for the public to know. It
created a new situation where the lobbyists were
ofﬁcially declared to work in the sunshine, while in
reality they were conveniently hiding behind
transparency.
MK Koll’s Bill scored the best according to the
CPI Index, but its weakness was ignoring the executive branch lobbyists and not demanding the spending disclosures from the lobbyists. Macher’s Bill
intended for the ﬁrst time to close the yawning
gap and to recognize the executive branch lobbyists
as lobbyists. Yet, the policy tools offered are not
very promising either, when one looks at the low
CPI score it has. For some reason, Israeli legislators
have feared to touch the spending issues and have
not demanded the mandatory spending disclosures,
as is widely practiced in the highly regulated lobbying regimes in order to create transparency and
accountability.
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Following the analysis of the effects of the lobbying regulation in the USA by Thomas (1998) and
Chari et al. (2010), one could ask, did Israeli MKs
know about the US lobbying regulations laws? It
appears in the Knesset Committee Protocols that
the initiators had outstanding knowledge about
the US lobbying laws—MK Sa’ar even gave a short
yet comprehensive lecture on the subject (Knesset
Committee Protocols, 2010, 31.12.07: pp. 44–45).
Also, MK Yechimovich had studied the US lobbying
laws with the purpose of bringing order to the lobbying sphere in Israel (Veksler, 2012: 275). One cannot but wonder whether the bills discussed served
the function of articulating aspirations for social betterment only, because they did not lead to implementation of any new actions on the ground, like
Shroff et al. (2012: 223) explained. One must admit
that the previously discussed legislative acts were
symbolic in that they prescribed a certain regulatory
intent of the government without at the same time
transforming this intent into concrete and enforceable legal requirements, as Matten (2003: 217) saw it.

CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the bills submitted to the Knesset
Speaker on 1993, 2001, 2007, 2013, and 2014, and
measured each bill’s strength according to the CPI
Index. The declared goals of all the previously mentioned bills were general and practically unachievable by using the policy tools of low regulations
systems. These legal initiatives were symbolic in
that they articulated aspirations for social betterment, but did not lead to implementation of new
actions on the ground.
There were high hopes in terms of transparency
and accountability at the time of the introduction
of the Lobbyist Law in 2008. If the MKs would have
really wanted to achieve more transparency in the
lobbying sphere, they should have adopted a highly
regulated regime, similar to the US lobbyist regulation with which they were well familiar with. Why
were more powerful policy tools of highly regulated
systems not used in order to achieve tangible results? Maybe the institutional failure in modern
societies that Matten (2003) observed in the environmental politics invites symbolic action also in the
lobbying regulations area? These and other questions must be answered by further research by investigating the possible disjuncture between what
the Lobbying Law says and how in fact it operates.
So far, the legislative path in Israel—as seen in the
proposed bills—is following the lobbying
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regulation trend of the USA and Canada (Chari
et al., 2010: 109; Veksler 2012: 277) and will hopefully become more rigorous as the bills will be
passed, and a new lobbyist law will ﬁnally have
some teeth.
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APPENDIX
CPI Index questions
1. In addition to legislative lobbyists, does the deﬁnition recognize
executive branch lobbyists?
2. How much does an individual have to make/spend to qualify as
a lobbyist or to prompt registration as a lobbyist, according to
the deﬁnition?
3. Is a lobbyist required to ﬁle a registration form?
4. How many days can lobbying take place before registration is
required?
5. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist
required on registration forms?
6. How often is registration by a lobbyist required?
7. Within how many days must a lobbyist notify the oversight
agency of changes in registration?
8. Is a lobbyist required to submit a photograph with registration?
9. Is a lobbyist required to identify by name each employer on the
registration form?
10. Is a lobbyist required to include on the registration form any
additional information about the type of lobbying work he or she
does (i.e., compensated or non-compensated/contract or salaried)?
11. Is a lobbyist required to ﬁle a spending report?
12. How often during each two-year cycle is a lobbyist required to
report spending?
13. Is compensation/salary required to be reported by a lobbyist on
spending reports?
14. Are summaries (totals) of spending classiﬁed by category types
(i.e., gifts, entertainment, postage, etc.)?
15. What spending must be itemized?
16. Is the lobbyist employer/principal on whose behalf the
itemized expenditure was made required to be identiﬁed?
17. Is the recipient of the itemized expenditure required
to be identiﬁed?
18. Is the date of the itemized expenditure required to be reported?
19. Is a description of the itemized expenditure required
to be reported?
20. Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist
required on spending reports?
21. Is spending on household members of public ofﬁcials by a
lobbyist required to be reported?
22. Is a lobbyist required to disclose direct business associations
with public ofﬁcials, candidates or members of their
households?
23. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and
reporting gifts?
24. What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving and
reporting campaign contributions?
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APPENDIX (Continued)
CPI Index questions
25. Is a lobbyist who has done no spending during a ﬁling period
required to make a report of no activity?
26. Is an employer or principal of a lobbyist required to ﬁle a
spending report?
27. Is compensation/salary required to be reported on employer/
principal spending reports?
28. Does the oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with
online registration?
29. Does the oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with
online spending reporting?
30. Does the oversight agency provide training about how to ﬁle
registrations/spending reports electronically?
31. Location/format of registrations or active lobbyist directory:
32. Location/format of spending reports:
33. Cost of copies:
34. Are sample registration forms/spending reports available the
Web?
35. Does the state agency provide an overall lobbying spending
total by year?
36. Does the state agency provide an overall lobbying spending
total by spending-report deadlines?
37. Does the state agency provide an overall lobbying spending
total by industries lobbyists represent?
38. How often are lobby lists updated?
39. Does the state have statutory auditing authority?
40. Does the state agency conduct mandatory reviews or audits?
41. Is there a statutory penalty for late ﬁling of lobby registration
form?
42. Is there a statutory penalty for late ﬁling of a lobby spending
report?
43. When was a penalty for late ﬁling of a lobby spending report
last levied?
44. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete ﬁling of a lobby
registration form?
45. Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete ﬁling of a lobby
spending report?
46. When was a penalty for incomplete ﬁling of a lobby spending
report last levied?
47. Does the state publish a list of delinquent ﬁlers either on the
Web or in a printed document?
48. Is there a ‘cooling off’ period required before legislators can
register as lobbyists?
Total CPI score
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